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ABSTRACT 
Religious identification has historically been salient in Northern Ireland as an ethnic-national 
identity marker. Thirteen years after the Good Friday Agreement which marked the start of the 
peace process in the country, the question arises whether religious affiliation in Northern Ireland 
has become less of an ethno-national identity marker and more of a personal choice. This paper 
analyses religious switching and apostasy between 2001 and 2011, using data from the Northern 
Ireland Longitudinal Study, a representative sample of approximately 28 percent of the 
population, linked to the 2001 and 2011 censuses. We found that the vast majority retained their 
self-reported religious affiliation, a tiny minority switched between Protestantism and 
Catholicism, and a significant minority, particularly among the young, switched to ‘none/not 
stated’ or between Protestant denominations. Religious switching is associated with young age, 
higher education, but also socio-economic deprivation. Experiences of social frustration appear 
to drive many to leave their faith. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In post-conflict societies with histories of religious and ethnic tensions, religion has often 
remained salient as a marker of national and/or ethnic identities (Hayes and Dowds 2015; 
Mitchell 2013; Hayes and McAllister 2009; Muldoon et al. 2007). Northern Ireland has been 
mentioned in the literature as a prominent example. Throughout Northern Ireland’s history 
(Catholic and Protestant) religious identities have been important markers of exclusive (Irish or 
British) national identities and have been at the center of the conflict (Barnes 2005; Coakley 
2007; R. J. McAllister 2000; Gallagher 1989). Religious and national identities have been 
intertwined to such an extent that they are often used synonymously (Anderson and Shuttleworth 
1998). However, by the Census year 2011, 13 years had passed since the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) between Northern Ireland’s main political parties and the British and Irish 
government which marked the beginning of the peace process.1 After such a long time, it might 
be expected that religious self-identification in Northern Ireland might have converged towards 
the general trend of religious decline that has been observed in most Western European countries 
(Bruce 2002; Voas and Crocket 2005; Pollack et al. 2012; Need and Graaf 1996). A long 
tradition of research on religious change in Europe found that industrialization, democratization 
and increasing political stability had brought a trend towards secularization in most countries 
                                                          
1 The Good Friday Agreement (GFA, or Belfast Agreement) was an agreement between the 
British and Irish governments and Northern Ireland’s main political parties on 10 April 1998. It 
set up a power-sharing Assembly to govern Northern Ireland. The agreement is understood as a 
key event in the Northern Ireland Peace process, which is marked by ceasefire and a cease of 
most of the violence (the ‘Troubles’) by the late 1990s. 
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(Norris and Inglehart 2004; Need and Graaf 1996; Graaf and Need 2000). Others found cohort 
change, younger cohorts becoming less religious than their elders (Voas and Doebler 2011; Hout 
and Fischer 2002). Evidence from the Northern Ireland census and from surveys suggests that 
religious attendance and religious self-identification in post-conflict Northern Ireland have 
shown signs of decline (Brewer 2015; Hayes and Dowds 2010).  
This study analyses transitions in religious self-identification in post-conflict Northern Ireland 
over a ten-year period, using representative data from a large population study, which is linked to 
2001 and 2011 census returns. Our sample comprises approximately 28 percent of the population 
of Northern Ireland. This permits a novel analysis which understands how people’s religious 
affiliations changed at successive censuses. 
The analysis addresses the following questions: How stable has religious identification in 
Northern Ireland been over the last census-decade? Do changes in religious identification differ 
by age cohort? Do people who switched their religious affiliation between 2001 and 2011 have 
certain socio-demographics and socio-structural traits in common? How do people who switched 
between Christian denominations and those who switched to ‘none/not stated’ differ from those 
whose self-identification remained stable over time?  
 
Religious Identification in Northern Ireland -- Stability over time or a Matter of Choice? 
Different theoretical approaches have been applied to understanding religious identification and 
religious switching: Perhaps the most prominent in the context of conflict societies are social 
identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979) and rational choice theory (Stark and Glock 
1968; Stark and McCann 1993). Both identity and rational choice theory are applicable to 
religious identification in Northern Ireland at different stages of its recent history, as both make 
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different assumptions about how individuals identify as members of a religion. While social 
identity theory sees religious affiliation as a group identity marker, influenced by a sense of 
collective belonging, the rational choice approach sees religious affiliation as a choice in a 
religious marketplace.  
Social identity theory is, perhaps, the most common approach in studies on Northern Ireland, 
where religious affiliation has been salient as an ethno-political identity marker for centuries. 
Social identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Turner 1975) claims that collective identities are important 
for people’s sense of who they are. According to the theory, individuals develop a sense of 
collective identity by delimiting their in-group from out-groups they do not endorse. Some 
research showed religious and ethnic identities to be highly stable over time (Huddy 2001) and 
responsive only to major life-changes (Cassidy and Trew 2004). Other research on Northern 
Ireland (Muldoon et al. 2007) found, however, that religious identities can change over relatively 
short periods of time, if an individual’s life-circumstances change. Such changes can occur as 
life-course events, e.g. in young adolescents when they leave the parental home to enter higher 
education. Young people entering higher education are at a crucial life-stage of transition of their 
social relationships (Cassidy and Trew 2004), new friends are made, partners are found, 
addresses and living environments change and new intellectual influences may transform the 
young person’s outlook. Cassidy and Trew (2004) observed that due to the still highly sectarian 
school system in Northern Ireland, the majority of Northern Irish students are exposed to much 
more religious diversity when they start university than at secondary school. Contact theory 
(Brown and Hewstone 2005; Pettigrew 1998) suggests that individuals become more open-
minded towards out-groups the more contact they have with them. Exposure to more diversity, 
contacts and mixing of friendship networks across religious groups are likely to weaken an 
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individual’s group identification, potentially motivating individuals to switch to a different 
denomination. The binding power of social (and religious) identities is thus at least to some 
extent context dependent. We therefore expect the highly educated and especially young adults 
moving away from the parental home to be more likely to switch, as religious identities are 
becoming less salient for this group. We hypothesize for both Catholics and Protestants: 
 
H1: Individuals who switch from having a religious affiliation to ‘none/not stated’, or switch 
between Catholic and Protestant religious denominations in Northern Ireland tend to be the 
highly educated, young and mobile (movers between geographical areas). 
 
This reasoning also accords with rational choice explanations. Rational choice theory 
views diversity and pluralism as crucial stimuli for religious mobility and switching. American 
sociologists (Finke and Stark 1998; Stark and McCann 1993; Warner 1993) theorized that 
modern religion in free societies can be compared to a market place, where individuals make 
religious choices over which denomination they prefer to identify with. The more pluralism and 
freedom of religion people experience in society, the more likely are they to view religious 
affiliation as a choice. 
Stark and Glock (1968) also found that the likelihood of religious switching in the US depended 
on the person’s social status and on levels of conservatism versus liberalism of the 
denominations switched to. This liberalism-conservatism divide in religious choices has also 
been highlighted by Hout and Fischer (2002, 2014), who found switching to ‘none’ in the US to 
be associated with political disaffection among younger cohorts with the rigid conservatism of 
their denominations. In Northern Ireland, religiously charged public disputes have taken place 
RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION, SWITCHING AND APOSTASY AMONG PROTESTANTS 
AND CATHOLICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
throughout recent years around abortion and LGBT rights (gay marriage in particular) and this 
was the case across Catholic and Protestant denominations. This, and the fact that religious 
identification is still strongly associated with the Northern Ireland conflict, is likely to have 
frustrated and alienated many young people, especially those with university education. Hayes 
and Dowds (2015) argue that this may have motivated many to turn their back on organized 
religion altogether. Indeed, research based on survey data found that church attendance has 
declined steadily in Northern Ireland since the 1960s (Brewer 2015, 215; Hayes and Dowds 
2010, 2). In line with this research and with Hout and Fischer (2014), we thus expect to find 
switching to ‘None/Not stated’ to be a phenomenon particularly among the younger, more 
educated.  
Others have emphasized that religious choices can be constrained by outward factors 
(Loveland 2003; Sherkat 2001; Sherkat and Wilson 1995), especially in societies that do not 
provide a free religious market. In countries where religious choice is constrained by state 
intervention, or, as was the case in Northern Ireland throughout much of its history, religiously 
charged conflict, religious switching is far less common than in free societies. Muldoon et al 
(2007) and Mitchell (2005) note that due to the Northern Ireland conflict, Protestant and Catholic 
religious identities have been strongly tied not only to national identities (as either British or 
Irish), but also to a sense of local communal belonging. Thus, strong mechanisms of social 
control in Northern Ireland’s highly segregated communities may have prevented many from 
considering switching to ‘none’ or to a different denomination in the past. This accords with 
Sherkat and Wilson’s (2001, 1995) emphasis on the import of normative constraints to religious 
choice. However, after the GFA of 1998, the peace process progressed, the threat of political 
violence of the past decreased since the early 2000s (McKittrick and McVea 2012, 290, 374) and 
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Northern Ireland has become a much more politically stable society, thus permitting people to 
view religious affiliation as a choice. In line with rational choice theory, we may thus expect 
religious affiliation to have become less of an ethnic identity-marker and more of a personal 
choice since then, especially for younger cohorts.  
This also accords with Norris and Inglehart (2004), who, from a modernization theory 
perspective, found that societies become more liberal and less religious through cohort 
replacement, younger less religious cohorts replacing older ones. Similarly, Hout, Greely and 
Wilde (2001) found changes in the membership of denominations in the US to be a result of 
cohort replacement.  
For the ten-year period of this study, we thus expect to observe an increase in the number of 
‘nones’ and significant numbers to have switched to a different denomination since 2001, 
particularly among the young. Cohorts coming of age after the Troubles may well be more likely 
to switch to ‘none’ and to switch between religious denominations than older generations who 
directly experienced the conflict. Research on religion in Northern Ireland using survey data 
found that attitudes of youths towards religion have indeed become more open-minded (Muldoon 
et al. 2007) and more secularized (Tonge et al. 2011) and that non-religious identification is 
becoming more common among the young (Muldoon 2004; Cassidy and Trew 2004).  
Both cohort effects (younger cohorts coming of age after the end of the Troubles) and life-course 
effects (young adolescents being more likely than older individuals to switch because of the life-
stage they are at) are likely to play an important part when it comes to religious switching. 
Relatedly, we expect to find another life-course effect at older ages. Older people tend to be 
more conservative and are less likely to switch to a different denomination (Schwadel 2011; 
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Voas and McAndrew 2012). We expect the very old and those who experienced a health-decline 
to be less likely than the healthy and young to switch to ‘none/not stated’ and more likely to 
switch from ‘none/not stated’ to a religion. The reasoning is that the ill and the very old are 
confronted with their mortality. Thus, the religious promise of an afterlife may offer some 
comfort (Jong, Halberstadt, and Bluemke 2012). Research repeatedly found people with 
declining health to become more religious over time (Jong, Halberstadt, and Bluemke 2012; 
McFarland et al. 2013). Again, these mechanisms should hold across both Catholic and 
Protestant denominations: 
 
H2: Individuals belonging to the oldest cohorts and those, who experienced a health-
decline between 2001 and 2011 are less likely than the young and those with stable 
health to switch from having a religious identification to ‘none/not stated’ and more 
likely to switch from ‘none/not stated’ to having a (Catholic or Protestant) religious 
identification in 2001. 
Another important factor, which likely influences whether individuals see religious 
affiliation as a choice is social disadvantage. A long tradition of research found social 
disadvantage to be positively related to religious devoutness and conservatism (Glock 1961; 
Stark and Glock 1968; Wimberley 1984; Coreno 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). Stark and Glock (1968) and Finke and Stark (1992) found in their research on 
American denominations that the socio-economically deprived preferred conservative over 
liberal denominations due to higher otherworldly compensations these denominations are 
assumed to offer. This link has been confirmed by other studies (Coreno 2002; Pyle 2006). 
However, in Northern Ireland the main distinction regarding religious choice is between 
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Catholicism, Protestantism and non-religion, and not along an axis from liberal to conservative. 
Northern Ireland’s main denominations within Protestantism, the Presbyterian Church, Church of 
Ireland and Methodist Church do not seem to differ much with regards to their levels of 
conservatism, nor is it plausible to assume a difference in levels of conservatism between 
Catholicism and Protestantism in Northern Ireland. The crucial question is whether individuals 
switch between denominations at all, whether they switch across the Protestant-Catholic divide 
and how many leave their faith altogether. In the Northern Irish context, the most conservative 
religious choice available is to stay put.  
We expect the socio-economically deprived to be less likely to switch than people who are not 
deprived. The reasoning behind this is that the socially disadvantaged have fewer choices in the 
material realm and are therefore also less likely to be aware of having choices in the immaterial, 
religious realm. This accords with Norris and Inglehart’s theory that social and material 
insecurity encourage religious devoutness and discourage switching, particularly to ‘none’ 
(Norris and Inglehart 20014: 243).  
H3: People who are unemployed, those who live in socially rented housing and those living 
in income-deprived residential areas are less likely than those in employment, homeowners 
and those living in non-deprived areas to switch their religious identification.  
 
Lastly, we examine, whether living in religiously segregated residential areas affects people’s 
propensity to switch to a different religious identification. Religiously segregated areas are areas 
where one religious denomination dominates with little to no religious diversity. Including the 
extent of segregation into the analysis is important because Northern Ireland is (still) a highly 
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religiously segregated society and living in highly religiously homogenous communities is likely 
to influence an individual’s choice of religious identification (Mitchell 2005).  
Because religious segregation is a strong historical context in Northern Ireland, which was found 
to create and reinforce contesting religious identities (Mitchell 2005; Mitchell 2013; Muldoon et 
al. 2007), we expect religious switching and apostasy to be less prevalent in more religiously 
segregated communities: 
H4: Individuals are less likely to switch to a different denomination or to switch to ‘none/not 
stated’, the more religiously segregated their area of residence is.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The analysis is based on data from the Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study (NILS). The 
NILS is a representative sample of the population of Northern Ireland; sampling is based on 104 
(out of 365 possible) birthdates and on records from the Northern Ireland Health Card 
Registration system (NIHCR) (O’Reilly et al. 2011; Johnston, Rosato, and Catney 2010, 5–6). 
Every inhabitant of Northern Ireland who has a health card registration and is born on one of the 
104 NILS-dates, is a NILS member. The NILS comprises approximately 28 percent of the 
population of Northern Ireland, approximately 450,000 people out of a total population of 1.8 
million. All individuals living in Northern Ireland, who were present in the Northern Ireland 
Health Card registration system in 2001 and 2011, and who have a 2001 and 2011 census record, 
are members of our sample (O’Reilly et al. 2011; Johnston, Rosato, and Catney 2010). Nearly all 
of Northern Ireland residents have health cards, since having registered for a health card is a 
legal requirement to be able to access the National Health Service (NHS). The proportion of the 
NILS population linked to the 2001 and 2011 Censuses exceeded 95 percent (NISRA 2015). The 
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NILS sample is thus representative of the NI population since the census aims to cover 100 
percent of the population.  
The analysis focuses on individual-level change of religious identifications between the two 
censuses 2001 and 2011 and its predictors using multinomial logit modeling in STATA 14. The 
research interest is in individuals who were adults by 2011 and can thus be assumed to be 
capable of making informed decisions over their religious choices. We therefore include only the 
sub-set of NILS members aged 10 years or older in 2001 (and subsequently 20 years or older in 
2011) and who were enumerated in both the 2001 and the 2011 censuses. The full sample of 
NILS respondents aged 10 years and older in 2001 is N=389,445. Of those respondents, 80,303 
were not enumerated in the 2011 Census due to either death or out-migration out of the country, 
and 4,996 were reported on the household questionnaire as ‘non-resident students’ and we 
therefore do not have their religious identification. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Religious identification was asked in the 2001 census with a filter “Do you regard 
yourself as belonging to any particular religion?” (1=yes; 0=no). Individuals who responded 
‘yes’ to the first question were asked a second question, “what religion, religious denomination 
or body do you belong to?”. The 2001 census variable measuring religious identification had 193 
categories, many of which have sample sizes far too small for meaningful comparisons.2 For the 
                                                          
2 The Census question on religious self-identification was in an open format, the respondents 
wrote their religion on the form. The answers were then coded by the Northern Ireland Statistics 
Agency (NISRA) into the census variable containing 193 categories.   
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purpose of this study, the two variables were recoded into a new variable capturing the 7 main 
religious groups that exist in Northern Ireland (1= Roman Catholic, 2=Presbyterian Church of 
Ireland, 3=Church of Ireland, 4=Methodist Church in Ireland, 5=Protestant other, 6=other 
non-Christian, 7=no religion).  
In 2011, the census questions were unfortunately asked slightly differently than in 2001. 
The first question on religion in 2011 was “what religion, religious denomination or body do you 
belong to?” Respondents, who did not report a religious affiliation, were then asked what 
religion they were brought up in. This second question was used by the census Office to impute 
non-responses to the first question. Our analysis includes only the original answers to the first 
question with no imputed values. This is important because we are interested in change of 
religious self-identification from 2001 to 2011, not in the religion respondents retrospectively 
said they had in childhood, or values that have been imputed to them. The fact that the Census 
question on religious identification was asked differently between the two Censuses is a potential 
source of bias. The wording of the 2011 question can be seen as leading, thus potentially 
inflating the numbers of religious and under-estimating the number of non-religious people in 
2011. This is a limitation to our study but is arguably outweighed by the population-level 
coverage of the NILS.  
Like the 2001 census variable on religious identification, the 2011 census variable was 
coded into 7 categories: 1= Roman Catholic, 2=Presbyterian Church of Ireland, 3=Church of 
Ireland, 4=Methodist Church in Ireland, 5=Protestant other, 6=other non-Christian, 7=no 
religion. 
The analysis first examines percentage change in religious identifications across the 
seven categories between the two censuses. For the multinomial model of religious identities and 
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switching, we recoded religious identification into the three categories Protestant, Catholic and 
‘none/not stated’ for both census years, and performed multinomial logit models of the 
respondents religious identification in 2011 regressed on the respondent’s religious identification 
in 2001.3 This was done in separate models for Catholics, Protestants and ‘none/not stateds’ (in 
2001). The reference category for the Catholic and Protestant models was ‘remained 
Catholic/remained Protestant in both census years’, the reference category for the ‘none/not 
stated’ model was ‘Protestant in 2011’.  
The reason for this modeling choice is firstly that the main religious divisions in Northern 
Ireland have been between Protestant, Catholic and ‘none/not stated’, rather than between 
denominations within Protestantism; secondly the three-category approach ensures better model 
stability. We performed the same model of religious switching across all seven religious 
categories, but this suffers from small numbers in some of the categories (e.g. switching from 
‘Catholic’ to ‘Presbyterian’ or ‘Methodist’), thus affecting the stability of the model. 
For the multinomial model of religious switching ‘none’ and ‘not stated’ were collapsed into one 
category to gain a sufficient number of observations for the model to be able to converge.  
The period of analysis, 2001 to 2011, was chosen based on the availability of reliable 
census data on religious affiliations for Northern Ireland. Furthermore, in 2001, the Peace 
Process had seen considerable progress and the years after 2001 saw the stabilization of the 
                                                          
3 We also performed the same model of religious switching across all seven religious categories, 
but this suffers from small numbers in some of the categories (e.g. switching from ‘Catholic’ to 
‘Presbyterian’ or ‘Methodist’), thus affecting the stability of the model. 
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Northern Ireland Assembly. The data thus allow us to study changes in religious identifications 
after the end of the most violent phase of the Troubles. 
 
Independent Variables 
The models include age coded as 10-year cohorts, education, changes in the respondents’ self-
reported health between 2001 and 2011, the respondents’ employment status, tenure (social 
housing, privately rented housing vs home-ownership). On the level of residential super-output 
areas (SOAs), we include the extent of Catholic and Protestant religious segregation.  
Our measure of religious segregation is based on the percentage of Catholics and Protestants in 
each respondent’s SOA of residence in 2001 and 2011. One SOA comprises approximately 700 
to 1000 households and there are 890 SOAs in Northern Ireland (NISRA 2015). The models 
include the square-rooted proportion of Catholics per SOA centered around the mean proportion 
of Catholics over all SOAs based on the 2011-Census. In addition, we also ran models including 
separately the percentages of Protestants and Catholics per SOA. 
 
Controls 
Our models also control for marital status, because it may impact on religious identification. 
Getting married or divorced is a major transition in an individual’s circumstances. Individuals 
who marry, especially when they marry across the Protestant – Catholic divide, may consider 
switching to their partner’s denomination. Those who experienced a divorce, on the other hand, 
may be more likely to switch from having a religious identity to ‘none’, or to switch back to the 
denomination they had before marrying. This concurs with research on the link between 
marriage and religious choice (Musick and Wilson 1995; O’Leary 2001; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, 
RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION, SWITCHING AND APOSTASY AMONG PROTESTANTS 
AND CATHOLICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
and Waite 1995; Lim, MacGregor, and Putnam 2010). Our sample does not contain information 
on what religion the respondent’s spouse belongs to, but research based on the census and on the 
UK Household Longitudinal Study (McAloney 2014) show that only between five and seven 
percent of marriages in Northern Ireland crossed the Protestant-Catholic divide in 2011.  
 
FINDINGS 
Overall, the Catholic to Protestant ratio of our sample remained largely the same between 2001 
and 2011 and changed only with regard to ‘other Protestant’ and ‘none/not stated’. In 2011, 38 
percent were Catholic, 48 percent were Protestant, and 14 percent were ‘none/not stated’. The 
Catholic group decreased by two percent (the vast majority who left the Catholic Church 
switched to ‘none/not stated’), while the Protestant group decreased by one percent.  
In 2011, a large majority of the respondents, 74 percent had retained the same religious 
identification they had in 2001, eight percent had switched from a religious identification to 
‘none/not stated’, five percent were ‘none’ or ‘not stated’ both in 2001 and in 2011, six percent 
had switched between different denominations (mostly within Protestantism) and seven percent 
of the respondents had switched from ‘none/not stated’ in 2001 to a religious denomination in 
2011. The vast majority of religious switching in Northern Ireland took place to ‘none/not stated’ 
and between denominations within Protestantism. Only 753 out of 304,146 respondents switched 
from Catholicism to Protestantism and 572 respondents switched from a Protestant denomination 
to Catholicism. However, seven percent of Catholics and 12 percent of Protestants switched to 
‘none/not stated’. We observe some significant churn within Protestantism: 11 percent of 
Protestants had switched to a different Protestant denomination by 2011. Table 1 shows the 
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numbers of respondents belonging to each religious group in 2001 and 2011 and contains the N 
and percentages for all possibilities of religious switching. 
[Table 1 about here] 
We see from Table 1 that the majority of switching within Protestantism took place from the 
Church of Ireland and ‘Protestant other’ to the Presbyterian Church and we also observe some 
switching from Presbyterianism to the Church of Ireland and to ‘Protestant other’.  
Table 2 shows the switching patterns by ten-year age cohorts. Both apostasy and 
switching are more prevalent among the younger cohorts. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
To test the hypotheses outlined earlier, we fitted a multinomial logit model of religious 
switching on age, sex, education, the respondent’s socio-economic and marital status, and area-
level religious segregation and income deprivation and ran this model separately for Catholics, 
Protestants and ‘none/not stateds’. The dependent variable is the respondents’ religious 
identification in 2011, coded as three categories: Catholic, Protestant, ‘none/not stated’. Those 
who reported the same religious (Catholic or Protestant) identification in 2001 and 2011 were 
left out as the reference category.4 In the model for those who were ‘none/not stated’ in 2001, 
‘Catholic in 2011’ is the reference category. 
The model was fitted in several steps: First, each variable of interest was included on its 
own, then the full model was run in a separate step controlling for the other variables. For 
                                                          
4 In the Protestant model, the reference category is ‘Protestant in 2011’. In the Catholic model, 
the reference category is ‘Catholic in 2011’. 
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reasons of space, we present only the coefficients of the final model. Tables 2 and 3 contain the 
full model with age included as ten-year cohorts.  
[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
We hypothesized in H1 that those who switch to a different religious affiliation tend to be 
the highly educated, young and movers between SOAs. The model coefficients (relative risk 
ratios) in Table 2 yield interesting results: Having a degree and intermediate education (as 
opposed to having low to no education) is statistically significantly positively related to 
switching to ‘none/not stated’ only for Protestants, but not for Catholics. Among Protestants, the 
odds of switching to ‘none/not stated’ are 12 percent higher for someone with a University 
degree and eight percent higher for someone with intermediate level education, compared to 
someone with lower education. However, education is unrelated to Protestant switching to 
Catholic. For Catholics, education levels are unrelated to all forms of religious switching. For 
those who were ‘none/not stated’ in 2001, higher education is strongly linked to remaining 
‘none/not stated’ in both years 2001 and 2011, as opposed to switching (back) into a religious 
affiliation. We already observed that there is some significant churn within Protestantism and 
that the vast majority of switching took place to ‘none/not stated’ (apostasy). Our multivariate 
results show that both are strongly linked to education for Protestants. 
Regarding age and spatial mobility, the model coefficients are as expected. For both 
Catholics and Protestants youth is strongly related to a higher likelihood of switching to 
‘none/not stated’. This holds especially for the youngest cohort of 10 to 17 year olds in 2001. 
Young Catholics in this cohort are 43 percent more likely than Catholics aged 40 to 49 to switch 
to ‘Non/not stated’, and Protestants in this youngest cohort are 88 percent more likely to switch 
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to ‘none/not stated’ and 82 percent more likely to switch to Catholic than 40 to 49-year-old 
Protestants. Note, that switching to Catholic is extremely rare among Northern Irish Protestants 
overall. 
Regarding those who reported no religious affiliation in 2001, remaining ‘none’ at both 
time-points occurred only among the middle-aged, as both the younger cohorts, and those aged 
60 to 69 are less likely than those aged 40 to 49 to be ‘none’ or ‘not stated’ at both time-points. 
The finding is not surprising, as the 10 to 17 year olds are, in 2001 still under age and largely 
affiliated with their parents’ religion. Among the youngest cohort, only 11 per cent were 
‘none/not stated’ in 2001 and only five percent of the youngest cohort were ‘none/not stated at 
both time-points’. In life-course terms, the middle-aged cohorts simply had more adult time to 
reconsider their religious choices. The 2021 census will be of great interest to follow up on this 
youngest cohort. Our two-time-point sample does not enable us to test to what extent the effect 
of age can be attributed to a life-course-effect, or might be a cohort-effect, but the evidence in 
the literature so far suggests that both likely play a part. The older the cohort, the less likely are 
respondents to engage in all forms of switching, and the less likely they are to have no religious 
affiliation. 
With regard to residential mobility, we find that those, who moved between SOAs are much 
more likely than non-movers to engage in all forms of religious switching. This indicates that the 
young and mobile are more flexible when it comes to religious identification. One plausible 
interpretation, in line with contact theory is that the geographically mobile have more contact 
opportunities with people from other religious backgrounds and this may change their outlook. 
 We can summarize that H1 is only partially confirmed by our models, as its assumptions 
regarding education only hold for Protestants but not for Catholics. For both Catholics and 
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Protestants, apostates (switchers to ‘none/not stated’) and switchers between Catholicism and 
Protestantism tend to be the young and geographically mobile.  
In H2 we hypothesized that the oldest cohorts and those who experienced a health-
decline are less likely than younger and healthier individuals to switch from having a religious 
affiliation to ‘none’ and more likely to switch from ‘none’ to having a religious affiliation in 
2011. The reasoning behind this was a life-course effect, the very old and those suffering from ill 
health are more confronted with their mortality than the young and healthy.  
The coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 indicate partial support for this hypothesis, but, again, 
only for Protestants. For them, old age and declining health are indeed negatively related to non-
religious self-identification and to switching. For Catholics, old age is unrelated to changes in 
their religious identification, and health decline is only associated with a lower likelihood of 
switching to Protestant, but unrelated to switching to ‘none/not stated’. For the non-religious (in 
2001), neither old age, nor declining health are related to switching to a Protestant (or Catholic) 
identification by 2011.  
 The analysis now moves on to the relationship between socio-economic deprivation and 
religious identification. In H3, we hypothesized that the unemployed and those living in socially 
rented housing and in income-deprived areas are less likely than those in employment, 
homeowners, and those living in less deprived areas to switch their religious identification.  
For both Catholics and Protestants, our models show that the unemployed are more likely than 
the employed to switch to ‘none’. Among Catholics, the unemployed are also slightly more 
likely to switch to Protestantism, but unemployed Protestants are no more likely than employed 
Protestants to switch to Catholicism. When looking at tenure, we again find for both Catholics 
and Protestants that those living in socially rented and privately rented housing are considerably 
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more likely to switch to ‘none/not stated’ and to switch between Catholic and Protestant 
denominations than homeowners. H3 is thus unsupported by the analysis. Socio-economic 
deprivation on the individual level is related to more religious switching (especially to ‘none/not 
stated’), not less.  
The picture is different when looking at deprivation as a context at the level of residential areas. 
Interestingly, Protestants living in an income-deprived areas are statistically less likely to switch 
to ‘none/not stated’ than Protestants who live in wealthier areas. Similarly, ‘nones’ living in 
deprived areas are less likely than those in non-deprived areas to remain ‘none/not stated’ in 
2011. For Catholics, living in deprived areas has no statistically significant effect on future 
religious identification. 
The findings on Religious area-segregation largely support H4. Catholics in more Catholic 
segregated areas are less likely to switch to Protestant or to ‘none’, and Protestants living in 
highly segregated Protestant areas are significantly less likely than those living in less segregated 
areas to switch to ‘none’. H4 is therefore supported by the analysis. Unsurprisingly, an 
individual’s likelihood of religious switching depends on the majority-denomination of their area 
of residence. The models show that Protestants living in highly segregated Catholic areas are 
slightly more likely to switch to Catholic, and Catholics living in highly segregated Protestant 
areas (model not shown here) are slightly more likely to switch to Protestant, although these 
effects are only small.  
Of the individual-level controls, individuals who are single, and those who experienced 
marital disruption and bereavement are more likely to switch (to ‘none/ not stated’) than the 
married. Also, the widowed are more likely than the married to switch to ‘none’. This is 
surprising, as the widowed tend to be in the older cohorts who are less likely to switch on 
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average. In the absence of survey questions asking the widowed about their reasons for 
switching, this finding is difficult to interpret. It may be the case that some turned their back on 
religion after experiencing the loss of a partner, but this interpretation remains speculative.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Northern Ireland is still a society with exceptionally high levels of religious 
identification. The vast majority, 86 percent identified with a religious denomination in 2011 and 
over two thirds retained the same religious affiliation they had in 2001. The numbers of those 
who switched between Protestantism and Catholicism and vice versa are tiny (less than one 
percent for both main denominations). Overall, religious switching is mostly to ‘none/not stated’, 
followed by switching within Protestantism. 11 percent of the Protestant population have 
switched to ‘none/not stated’ and six percent had switched to a different Protestant denomination 
between 2001 and 2011. Among Catholics, religious switching is far less prevalent than it is 
among Protestants and those who do switch, switch to ‘none/not stated’, rather than into 
Protestantism. This finding is not exclusive to Northern Ireland. It concurs with similar findings 
on Catholicism in the US and the Netherlands (Finke and Stark 1992; Sherkat and Wilson 1995; 
Need and Graaf 1996). Other survey research, more specifically on Northern Ireland (Goeke-
Morey et al. 2014) found similarly that socio-economically deprived Protestants tend to have a 
weaker sense of religious identity, while Catholic self-identification tends to be more stable. 
The multivariate analysis yielded some common and some differential patterns for 
Protestants and Catholics. As expected, among both Protestants and Catholics, the young and 
geographically mobile are more likely to switch to ‘none’. H1 is thus partially confirmed. 
Among Protestants, the youngest cohorts are also more likely to switch between (Protestant) 
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denominations than older cohorts, people who are less mobile and those suffering from illness. 
We proposed a life-course explanation: Young people who leave the parental nest start 
developing their own identities, are inspired by more religious diversity they experience at 
University or in the workplace, and are thus more likely to switch, whereas to older people and 
those suffering from illness, religion may offer comfort and may help reconcile the individual 
with the human fact of mortality (Jong, Halberstadt, and Bluemke 2012). However, this 
explanation holds only for Protestants and only to an extent. While for Protestants, we found a 
significant relationship between cohort and switching to other (Protestant) denominations, for 
Catholics a cohort effect was found only with regards to apostasy (switching to ‘none/not 
stated’). The religious diversity argument of contact theories that we discussed earlier does not 
hold. Given that for both Catholics and Protestants the numbers of those who entered the 
Northern Irish higher education sector were very similar in the 2001 Census (Osborne and 
Shuttleworth 2004), one could have expected to find the same life-course/diversity and education 
effects in both our Protestant and Catholic models. But our results show that this is not true for 
Catholics. It has to be noted that in Northern Ireland, due to the country’s history, crossing the 
Catholic-Protestant divide comes at a higher cultural barrier and at higher opportunity costs than 
switching between Protestant denominations. Even for the youngest cohorts of both 
denominations, religious switching does not significantly bridge the historical Protestant-
Catholic divide in Northern Ireland.  
Nevertheless, the finding that 12 percent of the 10 to 17 year olds and 10 percent of the 
18 to 29 year olds had switched to ‘none/not stated’ between 2001 and 2011 (compared to eight 
percent of those aged over 30) exhibits a modest cohort change among the young who came of 
age after most of the political violence had ceased (McKittrick and McVea 2012). This cohort 
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change may at least to some extent reflect a successful peace process that has slowly built a more 
politically stable environment, in which religious identification is, at least for the young, 
increasingly becoming a matter of personal choice, rather than purely an ethno-political identity 
marker, albeit for many this means choosing non-religion.  
One could argue that the peace process in Northern Ireland is a period effect that affects 
all cohorts equally. However, other research (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 
2005) suggests that large-scale societal changes towards political stability and freedom tend to 
affect primarily the young, whose political socialization is influenced by the newfound changes 
to a greater extent than older cohorts. Our data clearly show marked cohort differences in 
apostasy and religious switching. The next Northern Ireland census in 2021 will offer more 
insights into this; We expect to find a continuation of this cohort-effect in the next census. Our 
analysis based on 2011 data shows clearly that thus far, the newfound religious choice among the 
young is largely a choice against organized religion. In the 2011 Census, thirteen years after the 
Good-Friday agreement, we observe a significant increase in religious ‘nones’.  
The increase in ‘nones’ could be an expression of socio-political frustration - especially among 
young, university educated and geographically mobile Protestants, who may be dissatisfied with 
rigid religious institutions that promote strict conservative values (e.g. on the rights of 
homosexuals and abortion) and have often been criticized for not having played a more active 
role in the peace process (Hayes and McAllister 2009; Mitchell 2005). Our models found that 
switching to ‘none/ not stated’ is prevalent particularly among educated and the geographically 
mobile Protestants. To summarize, both H1 and H2 are only partially supported, and more for 
Protestants than Catholics. 
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Our models also showed that some of the switching to ‘none/not stated’ is explained not 
by the (subjective) frustration of elites, but also by real socio-economic disadvantage of the 
worse off. Moreover, the statistical effect of socio-economic disadvantage follows the same 
patterns among Protestants and Catholics. For both denominations, the unemployed, 
economically inactive, and those living in socially rented housing are more likely to switch to 
‘none’ and also slightly more likely to switch to the other large denomination.  
Socio-economic frustration seems to motivate significant numbers among both 
Protestants and Catholics to turn their back on organized religion. H3 is thus unsupported by our 
analysis. Interestingly, for Protestants, the relationship between social (dis)-advantage and 
switching to ‘none’ appears to be u-shaped, as both the socio-economically and educationally 
disadvantaged and the highly educated youths and the better off show an increased likelihood of 
seceding from church. For Catholics, education does not make a significant difference to 
religious identification. For Catholics it is clearly the worse off, not the better off, who switch. 
Note, however, that the numbers of switchers between denominations are very small.  
These findings are unique to Northern Ireland and are not replicated in other parts of the 
UK (Voas and McAndrew 2012; Mitchell 2004), but they do concur with similar findings on 
political frustration effects and seceding from church among young people in the US. Research 
in the rational choice tradition in the US (Glock 1961; 1968; Finke and Stark 1992) found that 
Protestant switching (to more conservative denominations) in the US occurred especially among 
the socially disadvantaged who seek compensation for this-worldly deprivation through promises 
of other-worldly rewards. Other research found similarly that switching occurred among 
younger, liberal Americans out of frustration with their churches’ conservative values (Hout and 
Fischer 2002, 2014; Baker and -Smith 2009; Sherkat and Wilson 1995). We found clear evidence 
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for a religious mobility dynamic away from organized religion among the young in Northern 
Ireland, which is likely driven by similar motives. Our interpretation that socio-economic and 
political frustration may have encouraged religious change in Northern Ireland also concurs with 
other literature on religious change in Northern Ireland (Brewer 2015, 121; I. McAllister 2005), 
e.g. McAllister (2005) found, using survey data, strong associations between declining church 
attendance and political dissatisfaction across denominations and a cohort effect similar to our 
findings. Younger generations in Northern Ireland appear to want to move away from the 
historical tensions of the past, towards a society where religious identification is a choice, not a 
collective identity-marker. Our interpretation must remain cautious, as the NILS and the Census 
do not contain questions on political attitudes, or ask respondents, what motivated them to switch 
or to become apostates. 
In summary, we conclude that at the individual level three different mechanisms appear 
to be at work. Firstly, we observed a cohort effect of younger people across denominations being 
more likely to switch to ‘none/not stated’. Secondly, social frustration seems to drive the socially 
disadvantaged to leave old religious identifications behind and to seek new ones, or to turn away 
from religion altogether. Thirdly, many socially advantaged, mobile and educated Protestants, on 
the other hand, may turn their back on religion, because they are seeking more modern, liberal 
and secular identities - a process that has also been observed in other non-conflict Western 
European societies (Graaf and Need 2000; Bruce 2002; Crockett and Voas 2006; Pickel 2009; 
Pollack et al. 2012). An exception to this is the absence of an education effect for Catholics. We 
found Catholic identification to be more stable overall than Protestant identification, regardless 
of education, but social disadvantage, i.e. unemployment and housing deprivation do promote 
both switching and apostasy for Catholics and Protestants alike.  
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Overall, religious identification in Northern Ireland appears to be transitioning from 
being a politically assigned label, to being a matter of personal choice. As discussed, this new 
choice appears to be largely a choice for non-religion. Our findings seem to indicate a slow 
process of secularization, but at this stage, it is too early to tell. 
With regard to area-level religious segregation, our models showed the expected results. 
Living in a strongly segregated area of one’s own religion is linked to a lower likelihood of both 
switching and seceding (switching to ‘none’). Living in a strongly segregated area of the other 
(Protestant or Catholic) religion leads to a slightly higher likelihood of switching to the other 
large denomination, perhaps through inter-marriage. These area-level findings concur with social 
identity theory (Leonardelli and Brewer 2001; Brewer 1993; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Sachdev 
and Bourhis 1991) which has long theorized an identity-strengthening effect of being surrounded 
by others who share the same group identity – in particular, as is the case for many 
neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland, when living in close geographical proximity to 
communities representing out-groups. The future will tell, whether the segregation effect will 
become less salient over time.  
Given the recent political concerns that Britain’s departure from the European Union 
could pose a threat to the Northern Ireland Peace process, as it may lead to a closing of the 
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, we might speculate that religious 
identification might gain in salience as an identity marker again in the future. The 2021 census 
will likely give new answers as to how religious identification dynamics in Northern Ireland will 
unfold.  
Last but not least, we would like to acknowledge some limitations to this study: Firstly, 
religious self-identification is not the same as religiosity, nor is it the same as ‘identity’. The 
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NILS does not contain measures of religious practice or intensity of religious identification and 
beliefs and it does not expressly question people’s identities. Thus, we do not know how many of 
those who identify with a religion actively practice it, consider themselves religious, or view 
affiliation as an integral part of a collective identity. Future studies combining our findings with 
survey evidence could add important new insights into the landscape of religious change in 
Northern Ireland and its attitudinal motivations. Secondly, the fact that the census question on 
religious affiliation has changed in the 2011 census may have biased our religion measure. We 
expect that the 2011 census question will have underestimated the number of ‘nones’ for both 
Protestants and Catholics. Despite this likely bias, we found clear patterns of relationships 
between age, education, socio-economic status and religious secession and switching. Thirdly, in 
order to allow for meaningful analyses of ‘nones’ and ‘not stateds’, the two categories were 
collapsed to avoid convergence issues with too small group sizes. This may have caused some 
loss of information, as other research found that there are individuals among the ‘not stateds’ 
who are more religious than those who expressly identify as ‘none’ (Lim, MacGregor, and 
Putnam 2010; Kosmin, Keysar, and Navarro-Rivera, 2009; Hout and Fischer 2002; Vernon 
1968). Fourthly, our data cover only two time-points with a ten-year interval. Thus, we cannot 
capture whether someone switched multiple times during the ten-year interval. However, we 
have no reason to assume that large numbers switched multiple times between the two censuses, 
given that the vast majority reported the same religious affiliation at both time-points and given 
that most switches were to ‘none’. Lastly, because we do not have reliable longitudinal data 
covering the whole period of the ‘Troubles’, it is not possible to distinguish empirically how 
much of the hypothesized relationship between religious switching and age may be due to 
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period, cohort, or life-cycle effects, but based on theory and on our knowledge of the recent 
history of Northern Ireland, it is very plausible that all three play significant parts.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The analyses of this paper tried to shed new light on the landscape of religious 
identification and switching among Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. Based on an 
exceptionally large sample representative of the population of Northern Ireland, we find that 
patterns of religious switching are related to age, education, socio-economic disadvantage and 
area-level religious segregation. Our findings indicate that a slow process of religious change 
seems to be at work for a minority among both the young, educationally advantaged and mobile, 
and the socio-economically disadvantaged. Religious switching in Northern Ireland is far more 
likely to occur among Protestants than Catholics and it still only very rarely bridges the 
Protestant - Catholic divide. The vast amount of switching observed in this study was either to 
‘none/not stated’, or remained within Protestantism. Our data indicate some early support for a 
beginning process of secularization in Northern Ireland. Future studies of religious identities in 
Northern Ireland using the Census could yield important new results regarding the beginning 
cohort change we observed, and studies using survey questions on reasons for religious 
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Table 1: Religious Switching among the Adult NILS Population, 2001 to 2011, Row Percent 
 














Religion in 2001: 
      
 
 
Roman Catholic, Percent 91.96 .15 .20 .03 .26 7.41 100 119,383 
Presbyterian Church, Percent .25 80.48 4.85 1.17 3.07 10.18 100 67,960 
Church of Ireland, Percent .42 8.00 78.38 1.15 2.19 9.86 100 49,308 
Methodist Church, Percent .32 9.06 5.12 68.84 3.98 12.67 100 11,418 
Other (Protestant), Percent .81 12.55 5.22 2.40 64.15 14.87 100 19,675 
None/Not stated, Percent 16.12 15.84 11.94 2.87 7.9 45.32 100 36,402 
Total, Percent 38.21 22.38 15.83 3.54 6.39 13.65 100 100 
Total (N) 116,226 68,083 48,139 10,774 19,423 41,501 100 304,146 
Note: The column Totals do not add to 100% because the frequencies of switchers from ‘other non-Christian religions’ could not be shown, 











Table 2: Religious Switching by Ten Year Age Cohort, 2001 to 2011, Column Percent  
10-Year Age Cohorts: 
  
Religious Transitions 2001 – 2011: 10-17 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80plus Total 
Switched to none (%) 12.2 10.4 8.1 6.7 6.1 5.8 6.5 7.6 8.2 
 
Remained the same religious identification 
(%) 
70.5 68.6 71.7 74.2 77.0 80.1 80.3 77.1 73.5 
Remained the same non-religious  
identification (%) 
5.0 6.1 6.5 6.5 5.2 3.2 2.3 1.5 5.4 
Switched between religious identifications 
(%) 
6.3 7.4 6.7 5.7 5.7 5.4 6.0 8.5 6.3 
From ‘None/ not stated to religious (%) 6.0 7.5 7.1 6.9 6.2 5.5 4.9 5.3 6.5 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 3: Multinomial Logit Model of Religious Switching, Catholic and Protestant 
 Model 1 Model 2  
















Age: 10 - 17 1.351 [.963 1.895] 1.431* [1.293 1.584] 1.823* [1.220 2.723] 1.884* [1.743 2.037] 
Age: 18 - 29 1.126 [.843 1.505] 1.065 [.971 1.168] 1.097 [.782 1.538] 1.436* [1.340 1.539] 
Age: 30 - 39 1.193 [.944 1.507] 1.099* [1.017 1.187] 1.154 [.888 1.501] 1.212* [1.143 1.285] 
Age 40 - 49 (refcat) . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Age: 50 - 59 .846 [.636 1.125] .941 [.861 1.029] .645* [.474 0.877] .848* [.795 .905] 
Age: 60 - 69 .811 [.542 1.214] 1.002 [.889 1.129] .363* [.223 0.591] .757* [.696 .825] 
Age: 70 - 79 .790 [.447 1.397] .958 [.814 1.127] .171* [.085 0.345] .759* [.679 .849] 
Age: 80 plus .534 [.163 1.742] 1.008 [.824 1.463] .286* [.100 0.820] .711* [.591 .855] 
Degree 1.048 [.835 1.316] 1.012 [.937 1.093]   1.001 [.757 1.323] 1.118* [1.057 1.182] 
A-levels (High-school 
level) 
.900 [.662 1.225] .970 [.881 1.068] .820 [.562 1.196] 1.063 [.991 1.141] 
Intermediate Education 
(GCSE) 
.956 [.765 1.195] 1.016 [.948 1.089] .792 [.602 1.041] 1.082* [1.028 1.139] 
Health decline .937* [.980 .829] .984 [.959 1.042] .937 [.966 1.178] .928* [.947 .909] 






RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION, SWITCHING AND APOSTASY AMONG PROTESTANTS 
AND CATHOLICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
 
Table 4: Multinomial Logit Model of Religious Switching: ‘None/Not Stated in 
2001’  
None/Not Stated to Protestant  None/Not Stated to None/Not 
Stated  
RRR CI CI RRR CI CI 
Age: 10 - 17 0.937 [0.796 1.103] 1.033 [0.885 1.206] 
Age: 18 - 29 0.974 [0.850 1.117] 0.765* [0.672 0.872] 
Age: 30 - 39 0.943 [0.842 1.057] 0.887* [0.796 0.988] 
Age 40 - 49 (refcat) . . . . . . 
Age: 50 - 59 1.116 [0.983 1.268] 1.038 [0.918 1.172] 
Age: 60 - 69 1.099 [0.918 1.315] 0.836* [0.700 0.998] 
Age: 70 - 79 1.149 [0.891 1.481] 0.790 [0.611 1.021] 
Age: 80 plus 2.110* [1.281 3.475] 0.737 [0.426 1.276] 
Degree 0.901 [0.807 1.006] 1.894* [1.709 2.098] 
A-levels (High-school level) 1.030 [0.896 1.184] 1.559* [1.366 1.778] 
Intermediate Education 
(GCSE) 
0.988 [0.887 1.100] 1.356* [1.223 1.503] 
Health decline 1.024 [0.984 1.065] 0.982 [0.946 1.021] 
Gender (female) 0.859* [0.799 0.925] 0.739* [0.689 0.792] 
Self-employed 1.177* [1.009 1.372] 1.328* [1.148 1.538] 
unemployed 0.962 [0.801 1.155] 1.057 [0.891 1.254] 
occupationally inactive 0.971 [0.877 1.076] 0.936 [0.848 1.033] 
Retired 1.174 [0.942 1.464] 0.968 [0.774 1.210] 
Single 0.816* [0.735 0.905] 0.933 [0.845 1.030] 
Divorced 0.893 [0.788 1.013] 0.998 [0.884 1.126] 
Widowed 0.813* [0.662 0.999] 0.822 [0.669 1.010] 
Social Renter 0.931 [0.839 1.032] 0.828* [0.750 0.915] 
Private Renter 1.048 [0.919 1.197] 1.177* [1.040 1.331] 
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Table 4 Continued 
 None/Not Stated to Protestant None/Not Stated to None/Not 
Stated 
 RRR CI CI RRR CI CI 
Urban Area 0.807* [0.735 0.887] 1.383* [1.264 1.514] 
Intermediate Settlement 0.802* [0.728 0.884] 1.048 [0.954 1.151] 
moved between areas 0.990 [0.917 1.069] 1.071 [0.995 1.153] 
Income deprivation of SOA 
(25% most deprived)  
0.920 [0.686 1.235] 0.518* [0.393 0.682] 
Percent Catholic per SOA 0.955* [0.953 0.956] 0.966* [0.965 0.968] 
Constant 21.881 [18.67] 25.64] 14.269 [12.25 16.61] 
None/not stated Model fit N  Log 
Likelihood 
Df AIC BIC 
 
36,246  -32115.8 56 64343 64819 
Note: Column ‘RRR’ are relative risk ratios (multinomial odds ratios), reference category: Catholic in 
2001; confidence intervals in square brackets, *P<0.010 
 
. 
